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Abstract
Inﬁnite time horizon stationary cooperative games are considered where at each date the instantaneous
NTU-game is determined by the state of nature. The strong sequential core selects those utility streams that
no coalition can improve upon by deviating at any moment in time. The main result of the paper states
that the strong sequential core is non-empty provided that (i) the instantaneous NTU-games in all states
are additively b-balanced, (ii) at least one of these games is strongly additively b-balanced, and (iii) the
discount factor is close enough to one.
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1. Introduction
The issue of cooperation has a long history both in game theory and in economics. Tradition-
ally, cooperation has been situated within static environments where time and uncertainty play
no essential role. A few works, in contrast, have been concerned with a phenomenon known as
dynamic cooperation: situations where cooperative decisions are to be made repeatedly during
time. Due to the extreme diversity of the phenomenon in question no unifying theory of dynamic
cooperation has emerged so far. Several attempts, however, have been made to develop a con-
cept of the core that would adequately predict the outcome of dynamic cooperation for speciﬁc
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economic or game-theoretic situations. In this paper we present a possible scenario of dynamic
cooperation formalized to a stationary cooperative game and examine a particular solution con-
cept for this game: the so-called strong sequential core.
Whenever cooperation takes place in a dynamic context, involved parties face plenty of pos-
sibilities to deviate from earlier agreements. A coalition of agents, for example, may consider to
cooperate within the grand coalition at the initial stages of the game only to split off later on. In
cases of uncertainty, where information becomes available over time, this is even more likely to
occur. Therefore, the core-concept for a dynamic cooperative game has to take its time and in-
formation structure explicitly into account in order to preclude coalitional deviations at all stages
and at all information sets that can potentially be achieved during the course of the game.
Sequential core concepts have been studied earlier in a number of works on dynamic coop-
eration. Gale (1978) has proposed a sequential core concept for a dynamic monetary economy.
Becker and Chakrabarti (1995) and Koutsougeras (1998) have considered core concepts for a
capital accumulation model and an asset market economy, respectively. Kranich et al. (2005)
have distinguished strong and weak versions of the sequential core and studied both versions in
a deterministic setting where the agents face a ﬁnite sequence of games with transferable utility.
Subsequently, Predtetchinski et al. (2002, 2006) have applied the concepts of the strong and the
weak sequential core to two-period economies where agents are given the possibility to exchange
assetsintheﬁrst period.InPredtetchinskietal.(2004)thestrongsequentialcorehasbeenstudied
in the framework of a stationary exchange economy.
InthepaperofFilarandPetrosjan(2000)ﬁnitetimehorizoncooperativegamesareconsidered
where at each stage the instantaneous TU-game depends deterministically on the instantaneous
game at the previous stage as well as on the history of play. In Petrosjan (1993, 1977) a game
of pursuit gives rise to a cooperative game with or without transferable utility that evolves in
continuous time and can be inﬂuenced by the players through a number of controls. In these
settings the authors address the question of dynamic stability (time consistency) of classical
cooperative solution concepts such as the core and the NM-solution. A solution is said to be
dynamically stable if it is robust to the objections at the beginning of the game as well as at any
subsequent moment of time. Thus the idea of dynamic stability is essentially the same as that
behind the concept of the strong sequential core.
In this paper we consider an inﬁnite time horizon cooperative game. At each moment in time
the game is in one of a ﬁnite number of states. The state determines the instantaneous NTU-
game to be played at that moment. Transition from one state to the next occurs according to
an exogenously given Markov process. A solution to a dynamic cooperative game must specify
utility payoffs for all agents conditional on every ﬁnite history of the state of nature.
The classical core of a dynamic cooperative game consists of all those utility streams that no
coalition can improve upon by deviating at the very beginning of the game for the rest of time.
This core concept is characterized as the core of a static NTU-game comprising the expected
present values of all feasible utility processes. The classical core is essentially a static concept,
for it neglects the time and the information structure of the game and overlooks the possibility of
coalitional deviations at later stages.
Assuming that any coalition of players is free to deviate at any moment of time, we consider
the subgames of the original dynamic game, where a certain ﬁnite history of the state of nature is
common knowledge among the players. The utility stream is said to be a strong sequential core-
element if it belongs to the classical core of every such subgame. The idea of deﬁning a subgame
consistent solution as an intersection of the solutions of the subgames is not new: already in
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A version of the strong sequential core concept studied in this paper is an adaptation of the
concept from Gale (1978), Kranich et al. (2005) and from Predtetchinski et al. (2002, 2004).
The central question of the paper is that of non-emptiness of the strong sequential core. Many
robust examples of empty strong sequential core in the two-period economy are presented in
Predtetchinski et al. (2002). A particularly sharp emptiness result is obtained for two-period
ﬁnance economies with an incomplete set of available assets: in this class of economies the
strong sequential core is generically empty. In contrast, for stationary exchange economies
(Predtetchinski et al., 2004) the strong sequential core is non-empty given that the discount factor
is sufﬁciently close to one. In this paper we show that the strong sequential core in a stationary
cooperative game is non-empty, provided that
(i) the instantaneous NTU-games in all states satisfy an additive b-balancedness condition,
(ii) at least one of these NTU-games satisﬁes a strong additive b-balancedness condition, and
(iii) the discount factor is sufﬁciently close to one.
Both additive b-balancedness and strong additive b-balancedness strengthen Billera’s b-
balancedness condition (Billera, 1970). A special form of additive b-balancedness condition
was used earlier by Billera and Bixby (1973) and Billera (1974) to obtain a characterization of
market games.
In moredetail,the contentofthe paperisas follows.In Section2 stationarycooperativegames
are presented and the assumptions of the model are discussed. In Section 3 a characterization of
the strong sequential core is developed. We demonstrate that the classical core of the stationary
cooperative game consists only of stationary utility streams, provided that all transition proba-
bilities are positive and feasibility sets are strictly convex. This property of the core allows for
a representation of every dynamic subgame by means of a ﬁnite-dimensional static evaluation
game. We prove that the strong sequential core is non-empty if and only if the cores of the eval-
uation games have a non-empty intersection. The additive b-balancedness and strong additive
b-balancedness conditions are discussed in Section 4. The non-emptiness result for the strong
sequential core is presented in Section 5. More precisely, this result says that if a state-contingent
utility allocation belongs to the core of a speciﬁc limit game and is not feasible for any of the
proper coalitions, then it belongs to the strong sequential core whenever the discount factor is
close to one. An example of empty strong sequential core is presented in Section 6.
2. Stationary cooperative games
Let n be a positive integer. Denote by N the set of integers {1,...,n}.A nn-person game
with non-transferable utility, or an NTU-game for short, is a family of sets V =  V(Q) Q⊆N
satisfying the following conditions:
(G1)I f Q  =∅, then V(Q)is a non-empty closed subset of Rn; V(∅) =∅.
(G2) [x ∈ V(Q),y∈ Rn,yi  xi for all i ∈ Q] implies [y ∈ V(Q)].
(G3) There exists a vector m = (mi)i∈N in Rn such that V({i}) ={ x ∈ Rn | xi  mi} for all
i ∈ N, and the set V(N)∩{x ∈ Rn | x  m} is non-empty and compact.
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The ingredients of a stationary cooperative game   are as follows. The set N is the set of players
and S ={ 1,...,S} is the set of states. The symbol Us denotes the instantaneous non-transferable
utility game  Us(Q) Q⊆N in the state s ∈ S. The matrix π = (π(σ|s))σ,s∈S is a column stochastic
matrix of transitional probabilities: for any σ and s in S, π(σ|s)is the transition probability from
state s to state σ. We assume that the players’ preferences over utility streams can be represented
by the expected discounted utility function. The discount factor is given by δ ∈ (0,1).
Let C be a non-empty convex subset of Rn. Then the recession cone1 O+[C] of C is a set
consisting of all vectors y ∈ Rn such that C + y ⊆ C. The lineality space of C is a set of all
vectors y ∈ Rn such that C +y = C. The matrix π is said to be irreducible if it is not possible to
partition the set S in two subsets S1 and S2 in such a way that π(σ|s)= 0 for all s ∈ S1 and all
σ ∈ S2.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption (A).
(A1) Us is an NTU-game for all s ∈ S.
(A2)T h e s e t Us(Q) is convex for all s ∈ S and Q ⊆ N.
(A3) For each Q ⊆ N,i fz1,...,zS are vectors such that zs ∈ O+[Us(Q)] and z1+···+zS = 0,
then zs belongs to the lineality space of Us(Q) for all s ∈ S.
(A4) (O+[U1(N)]+···+O+[US(N)])∩Rn
+ ={ 0}.
(A5) The matrix π is irreducible.
Assumption (A1) requires the collection of sets Us to satisfy conditions (G1)–(G3).
The convexity assumption (A2) is essential for most of our results. It ensures that a coalition
that is able to improve upon a given utility stream can do so using a stationary utility stream. This
property of the model makes it possible to restrict attention only to stationary utility streams and
characterize a subgame of the stationary cooperative game by a static evaluation game. Without
the convexity assumption, non-emptiness of the classical core (let alone the non-emptiness of the
strong sequential core) becomes a considerably more complicated problem.
Assumptions (A3) and (A4) guarantee that the sum of the NTU-games Us over s ∈ S is an
NTU-game. They ensure that the sum of the sets Us(Q) is a closed set for each coalition Q, and
that the sum of the sets Us(N) intersected with all individually rational payoffs is bounded.
In particular, assumptions (A3)–(A4) are satisﬁed if there exists a real number M such that for
all Q ⊆ N, s ∈ S, u ∈ Us(Q), and i ∈ Q the inequality ui  M holds. In this case the recession






z ∈ Rn | zi  0 for all i ∈ Q
 
,
and the lineality space of Us(Q) is the set
 
z ∈ Rn | zi = 0 for all i ∈ Q
 
.
Of course, assumptions (A3)–(A4) are much more general. However, they restrict the ways in
which the sets Us(Q) may be unbounded.
Assumption (A5) ensures that for all s and σ in S there is a non-zero probability of ever
reaching state σ from state s.
Assumption (A) is sufﬁcient for most of our results. For Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, however,
the following strengthening of (A) is needed:
1 For a comprehensive study of recession cones and related concepts see Rockafellar (1997).54 A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 50–66
Assumption (A∗). Assumptions (A1)–(A5) are satisﬁed and, in addition,
(A6)T h e s e t Us(N) is strictly convex for all s ∈ S.
(A7) π(σ|s)>0 for all s,σ ∈ S.
A stationary cooperative game is a game with inﬁnite time horizon, so the set of time periods
or dates is T ={ 0,1,...t,...}. At each date t ∈ T the state takes on one of the values from the
set S determining the instantaneous NTU-game to be played at date t. The state follows a Markov
process with one-step transitional probabilities given by π. The state at date t = 0 is known to




(t,s0,s1,...,st) | t ∈ T,sτ ∈ S for all τ ∈{ 1,...,t}
 
consistsofallpossibleﬁnitehistoriesofthestateofnature.Atypicalelementξ = (t,s0,s1,...,st)
of the set D summarizes the information available to the players at time t. This information in-
cludes the current date t as well as the history (s0,s1,...,st) of the state of nature up to the
moment t. The state of nature st at the current date t is referred to as a current state. The map-
ping t : D → T assigns to each ﬁnite history ξ ∈ D the current date t(ξ). The mapping s : D → S
assigns to each ﬁnite history ξ the current state s(ξ).
A given ﬁnite history ξ = (t,s0,s1,...,st) gives rise to a set of histories that agree with ξ up
to date t. Formally, it is deﬁned as
D(ξ) =
 
(τ,σ0,σ1,...,στ) ∈ D | τ  t,σk = sk for all k ∈{ 0,1,...,t}
 
.
The probability that the state of nature will develop according to η = (τ,σ0,σ1,...,στ) condi-
tional on the history ξ = (t,s0,s1,...,st) up to date t can be computed using the formula:
ρ(η|ξ)=
 1, if η = ξ,
×τ
k=t+1π(σk|σk−1), if η ∈ D(ξ) and τ>t ,
0, otherwise.
A function U from D into Rn will be referred to as a utility stream. We write Uξ to denote the
values for the function U. The expected present value of the utility stream U conditional on the





Given a stationary cooperative game   and a ﬁnite history ξ of the state of nature, let  D(ξ)
denote the subgame of   that follows the realizations of the state of nature as speciﬁed in ξ.
We continue with the deﬁnitions of the classical core for the subeconomy  D(ξ) and of the
strong sequential core for the economy  . Essentially, the former deﬁnition requires that no
coalition be able to make all its members better off by deviating conditional on the history ξ.
The latter deﬁnition requires that for no particular history of the state of nature can a coalition
of players improve upon a proposed allocation. In this way, the strong sequential core eliminates
any incentives for coalitions to ﬁrst agree to a proposed allocation but break the agreement later
on.
Deﬁnition1.Theutilitystream U belongstotheclassicalcore C( D(ξ)) ofthesub-game  D(ξ) if
(1) Uη ∈ Us(η)(N) for all η ∈ D(ξ), and Vξ(U) is ﬁnite;A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 50–66 55
(2) there exists no coalition Q ⊆ N and no utility stream Y, such that Yη ∈ Us(η)(Q) for all
η ∈ D(ξ), Vξ(Y) is ﬁnite, and Vi
ξ(Y)>Vi
ξ(U) for all i ∈ Q.






3. A characterization of the strong sequential core
The characterizations derived in this section make use of stationary utility streams and a
closely related concept of an evaluation game. A utility stream U is said to be stationary if
its value Uξ at ξ ∈ D depends only on the current state s(ξ) and does not depend on time or the
history of the state of nature preceding the current date t(ξ). For any stationary utility stream U,
there is an (nS)-dimensional vector u = (u1,...,uS) with us ∈ Rn such that Uξ = us(ξ) for all
ξ ∈ D; we write U ={ u}.
Let IS denote the S-dimensional identity matrix. Observe that the matrix IS −δπ is invertible,
sincethespectralradiusofthematrix δπ equals δ<1.Letψ = (1−δ)(IS−δπ)−1,andfor every
p a i ro fs t a t e sσ and s let ψ(σ|s) denote an element of the matrix ψ at the intersection of row σ
and column s. Observe that the elements in a given column of the matrix ψ add up to 1. As we
assume (A5)m a t r i xπ to be irreducible, ψ(σ|s)>0 for all σ,s ∈ S.
Deﬁnition 3. The evaluation game Gs is a cooperative game where the possibilities of a coalition
Q are represented by the set U1(Q) ×···×US(Q), and the players’ expected utilities from





The core C(Gs) of the evaluation game Gs consists of all state-contingent utility tuples u in
U1(N) ×···×US(N) such that there is no Q ⊆ N and no y ∈ U1(Q) ×···×US(Q) with
vi
s(y) > vi
s(u) for all i ∈ Q.
Proposition 1. Let ξ ∈ D be a ﬁnite history of the state of nature with the current state s = s(ξ)
and let U ={ u} be a stationary utility stream. Then Vξ(U) = vs(u).
Proposition 1 is a well-known result. It makes it possible to interpret the evaluation game Gs(ξ)
as a static counterpart of the dynamic subgame of   starting at ξ where each coalition is conﬁned
to use stationary utility streams only. Indeed, the set U1(Q) ×···×US(Q) essentially consists
of all stationary utility streams feasible for the coalition Q, while the utility function vs(ξ) gives
the expected present value of a stationary utility stream {u} conditional on the history ξ.
Associated with each evaluation game is the NTU-game Vs that is essentially an image of Gs
under the function vs. More precisely, deﬁne Vs(Q) as the union of the vectors vs(u) as u ranges
in the set U1(Q)×···×US(Q). Thus, each point of Vs(Q) is the expected present value of some
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Clearly, the state-contingent utility tuple u is in the core of Gs if and only if vs(u) is in the core
of Vs.
Proposition 2 below states that the collection Vs satisﬁes conditions (G1)–(G3). In particular,
the assumptions (A3) and (A4) guarantee that Vs(Q) is a closed set, and that the intersection of
Vs(N) with the set of individually rational payoffs is bounded.
Proposition 2. Let   be a stationary cooperative game satisfying Assumption (A). Then Vs is an
NTU-game.
Proof. Let Q be a non-empty subset of N. Then Vs(Q) is obviously a non-empty set. To prove
that Vs(Q) is a closed set, observe that for any positive number λ and any convex subset C of Rn,








From this, from Assumption (A3) and Corollary 9.1.1 in Rockafellar (1997, pp. 74–75), Vs(Q)











Condition (G2) and the ﬁrst part of condition (G3) can be easily veriﬁed. To prove that the set
Vs(N)∩{v ∈ Rn | v  m} isboundedweshowitsrecessionconetocontainonlyazerovector.By
Theorem 8.4 from Rockafellar (1997, p. 64), any non-empty closed convex set whose recession
cone consists only of the zero vector is bounded. By Corollary 8.3.3 from Rockafellar (1997, p.
64), if the intersection of two closed convex sets is non-empty, then its recession cone equals the






















The last of these equalities follows from assumption (A4). 
Theorem 1 provides a criterion for a given stationary utility stream to be an element of the
strong sequential core of a stationary cooperative game.
Theorem 1. Let   be a stationary cooperative game satisfying Assumption (A). Let a stationary
utility stream U ={ u} be given. Then
(1) U ∈ C( D(ξ)) if and only if u ∈ C(Gs(ξ)).
(2) U ∈ SSC( ) if and only if u ∈ C(Gs) for all s ∈ S.
Proof. To prove the ﬁrst part of Theorem 1 we demonstrate that a coalition Q ⊆ N is able to
improve upon U in the subgame  D(ξ) if and only if it can improve upon u in the evaluation
game Gs(ξ). The second part of Theorem 1 is an immediate corollary of the ﬁrst part.
Suppose that there is a deviation y from u by a coalition Q in the evaluation game Gs(ξ), that
is y ∈× σ∈SUσ(Q) and vi
s(ξ)(y) > vi
s(ξ)(u) for all i ∈ Q. Then the stationary utility stream {y} is
a deviation from the utility stream {u} in the subgame  D(ξ).A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 50–66 57
Suppose that there is a deviation from {u} by a coalition Q in the subgame  D(ξ),i . e .t h e
utility stream Y such that Yη ∈ Us(η)(Q) for all η ∈ D(ξ), Vξ(Y) is ﬁnite, and Vi
ξ(Y)>Vi
ξ({u})
for all i ∈ Q. Note that the utility stream Y need not be stationary. However, as we demonstrate in
the remainder of the proof, coalition Q can improve upon U using a stationary utility stream {z}.
Convexity of the feasibility sets plays the central role in our argument.






Observe that the process Y(T) is stationary as of date T and therefore is bounded. Since the
expected present value of Y(T) converges to that of Y as T goes to inﬁnity, there is a date











for all i ∈ Q.








Because the process Y(T0) is bounded, the sum in the above equation is well-deﬁned. Therefore,
zσ is a weighted average of the values for the process Y(T0) over all histories η in D(ξ) with
s(η)= σ. For all such histories, Yη(T0) ∈ Uσ(Q). Since the set Uσ(Q) is closed and convex,





























We see that the stationary utility stream {z} is a deviation from {u} by the coalition Q in the
subgame  D(ξ). Therefore, z is a deviation from u by Q in the evaluation game Gs(ξ). 
Theorem 2 gives sufﬁcient conditions for the classical core of the stationary cooperative game
to contain only stationary utility streams.
Theorem 2. Let   be a stationary cooperative game satisfying Assumption (A∗). Then all utility
streams in the classical core of   are stationary.
Proof. Consider an N-feasible utility stream U with a ﬁnite expected present value at time t = 0.
If U is not stationary, then there exist two histories λ,ς ∈ D such that s(λ)= s(ς) and Uλ  = Uς.
Note that both Uλ and Uς are the elements of the set Us(λ)(N). Under Assumption (A8), the58 A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 50–66
probabilities ρ(λ)and ρ(ς)of λ and ς conditional on the initial history (0,s0) are both positive.




belongs to the interior of Us(λ)(N). Therefore, there exists a vector y ∈ Us(λ)(N) such that
yi >u i for all i ∈ N. Deﬁne the utility stream Y as follows:
Yη =
 
Uη, if η  = λ,ς,
y, if η = λ, or η = ς.
The utility stream Y is feasible for the coalition N, the expected present value of Y is ﬁnite,
and is greater than that of the utility stream U at t = 0, for each player in N. Hence, Y is an
improvement upon U by the grand coalition at date t = 0. 
We conclude this section with a characterization of the strong sequential core.










4. Additive b-balancedness and strong additive
b-balancedness
Inthissectionweconsidertwobalancednessconditions:theso-calledadditive b-balancedness
and strong additive b-balancedness. When applied to the instantaneous NTU-game Us for
all s ∈ S, additive b-balancedness is sufﬁcient for non-emptiness of the classical cores of all
subgames of  . Moreover, if at least one of the NTU-games Us is strongly additively b-balanced
andthediscountfactor δ iscloseenoughtoone,thenalsothestrongsequentialcoreisnon-empty.
In what follows N∗ denotes the collection of non-empty proper subsets of the set N.L e tb
be a collection {bi
Q | Q ∈ N∗,i∈ Q} of non-negative real numbers such that
 
i∈Qbi
Q > 0f o r
each Q ∈ N∗.L e tB denote the set of all such collections. A collection β ⊆ N∗ of coalitions is





Q = 1, ∀i ∈ N.
The numbers λQ are called the balancing weights of the collection β. A particularly useful spec-
iﬁcation for the collection b ∈ B is the following one:
bi
Q = 1 for all Q ∈ N∗ and i ∈ Q. (1)
Deﬁnition 4. Let V be a game with non-transferable utility and b be an element of the set B.T h e
game V is said to be additively b-balanced provided that the following condition is satisﬁed: If
β ⊆ N∗ is a b-balanced collection of coalitions, {λQ}Q∈β are balancing weights, vQ ∈ V(Q)for








Q, ∀i ∈ N (2)A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 50–66 59
belongs to the set V(N). The NTU-game V is said to be strongly additively b-balanced provided
that any such vector vN belongs to the interior of V(N).
A special case of the additive balancedness condition with b speciﬁed as in Eq. (1) appears al-
ready in Billera and Bixby (1973) and in Billera (1974). As is discussed below, two well-known
classes of games satisfy the additive balancedness condition: market games obtained from an
underlying exchange economy (Example 1) and non-transferable utility games derived from an
underlying normal form game using the concept of α-efﬁciency as in Aumann (1961) (Exam-
ple 2).
Example 1. Consider an exchange economy where the consumption set Xi of player i is a
compact convex subset of an Euclidean space containing the initial endowment ei and the utility
function is a continuous map ui : Xi → R. In the associated market game V the utility proﬁle v





vi  ui(xi) for all i ∈ Q. Under the maintained assumptions the market game V is a well-
deﬁned non-transferable utility game. It is well known that the market game is balanced in the
sense of Scarf (1967) provided that the utility functions are quasi-concave. As is demonstrated in
Billera and Bixby (1973, Theorem 2.1), under a stronger assumption of concavity of the utility
functions,themarketgameisadditivelybalancedwithrespecttothecollectionb givenbyEq.(1).
Notice, however, that a market game need not be strongly additively balanced. As follows from
Proposition 4 below, if the core of the underlying exchange economy consist of a single point,
then the associated market game is not strongly additively balanced for any b ∈ B.
To construct an NTU-game that is additively b-balanced for a given collection b ∈ B,w e
modify the deﬁnition of a market game as follows. Think of the exchange economy as being
composed of n types of players, with each type being represented by a continuum of identi-
cal individuals, and of the collection b as ﬁxing the rates of participation of players in each





Qei, while for the grand coalition the feasible set is as in the market game.
An argument similar to that in the proof of Theorem 2.1 in Billera and Bixby (1973) shows that
the resulting NTU-game is additively b-balanced.
Example 2. Consider a normal form game where the strategy set Xi of player i is a compact con-
vex subset of an Euclidean space and the utility function is a continuous map ui :× i∈NXi → R.
Following Aumann (1961), we deﬁne a non-transferable utility game V using the concept of
α-efﬁciency, as follows: A utility proﬁle v is feasible for a coalition Q if there exists a joint strat-
egy x ∈× i∈QXi for the members of coalition Q such that vi  ui(x,y) for all joint strategies
y ∈× j∈N\QXj of the outside players and for all i ∈ Q. Scarf (1971) shows the game V to be
Scarf-balanced provided that the utility functions are quasi-concave. Under a stronger assump-
tion of concavity of the utility functions the game V can be seen to be additively-balanced with
respect to the collection b given by Eq. (1).
Thepropertyof(strong)additiveb-balancednessisadditiveovergamesinthefollowingsense.
Proposition 3. Let   be a stationary cooperative game satisfying Assumption (A), and let b ∈ B.
Suppose that the instantaneous NTU-games Us are additively b-balanced in all states s ∈ S.
Then the NTU-games Vs are additively b-balanced for all s ∈ S. If, in addition, at least one60 A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 50–66
of the instantaneous NTU-games is strongly additively b-balanced, then the NTU-games Vs are
strongly additively b-balanced for all s ∈ S.
Proof. Let the b-balanced collection of coalitions β ⊆ N∗, the balancing weights {λQ}Q∈β, and
the vectors vQ ∈ Vs(Q) for all Q ∈ β be given. Let the vector vN ∈ Rn be deﬁned by Eq. (2).



















If the instantaneousgames Uσ are additively b-balanced in all states, then the vector uNσ belongs
to the set Uσ(N) for σ ∈ S, implying that vN is an element of the set Vs(N). If, in addition, at
least one of the instantaneous NTU-games, say the game U¯ σ, is strongly additively b-balanced,
then uN ¯ σ is in the interior of the set U¯ σ(N). Since the number ψ(¯ σ|s) is positive, this implies
that the vector vN belongs to the interior of the set Vs(N). 
It is straightforward to show that any additively b-balanced NTU-game V is balanced in the




holds. It follows that an additively b-balanced game has a non-empty core. Let C∗(V) denote the
set of payoff vectors in the core of the NTU-game V that are not feasible for proper coalitions.
Formally,
C∗(V) = ∂V(N)
   
Q∈N∗
V(Q).
Proposition 4. If the NTU-game V is strongly additively b-balanced, then the set C∗(V) is non-
empty.
Proof. Let V be a strongly additively b-balanced NTU-game. For any b-balanced collection of





Deﬁne the NTU-game ¯ V as follows. Let ¯ V(Q)= V(Q)for all proper subsets Q of N, and let
¯ V(N)be the union of W(β)over all b-balanced collections β ⊆ N∗. We leave the veriﬁcation
of conditions (G1)–(G3) to the reader. By construction, the NTU-game ¯ V is b-balanced, and
therefore has a non-empty core. Let ¯ v be a core element of the game ¯ V.A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 50–66 61
Since V is strongly additively b-balanced, the inclusion W(β)⊂ intV(N)holds for any b-




t ∈ R | (¯ v +t1n) ∈ V(N)
 
,
where 1n is a vector in Rn with all components equal to one. As ¯ v is an element of ¯ V(N),i t
is also an element of V(N). Hence, 0 ∈ T . Since V(N)is closed, T is also closed. Moreover,
T is bounded from above for otherwise the set V(N)would coincide with Rn, violating condi-
tion (G3). It follows that the supremum ¯ t of the set T is ﬁnite, and is an element of T.
We show that the vector v∗ =¯ v + ¯ t1n belongs to the set C∗(V). Since ¯ t ∈ T ,w eh a v et h e
inclusion v∗ ∈ V(N).I fv∗ were an interior point of V(N), then there would exist a t>0 such
that (v∗ +t1n) is in V(N). Hence, (¯ t +t)would be an element of T , a contradiction.
Since 0 ∈ T, we know that ¯ t  0. If ¯ t were equal to zero, then v∗ =¯ v would be an element of
¯ V(N)and therefore an interior point of V(N). However, we already know that v∗ is not in the
interior of V(N).S o¯ t>0, and v∗i > ¯ vi for all i ∈ N.
If v∗ were an element of V(Q)for some Q ∈ N∗, then ¯ v would be an interior point of V(Q),
contradicting the choice of ¯ v in core of the game ¯ V. 
5. Existence results
We are now in a position to state our ﬁrst existence result. If the instantaneous NTU-games are
additively b-balanced in all states, then by Proposition 3 the evaluation games Gs possess non-
empty cores. Consequently every subgame of the stationary cooperative game has a non-empty
classical core. Thus we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let   be a stationary cooperative game satisfying Assumption (A), and let b ∈ B.
Suppose that each of the instantaneous NTU-games Us, s ∈ S, is additively b-balanced. Then the
classical core of any subgame of   is non-empty.
Let us now turn to the question of non-emptiness of the strong sequential core. Consider a
family of stationary cooperative games  δ parameterized by the discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).W e
are interested in the behavior of the strong sequential core as δ approaches one. In the rest of
this section, we use the notation ψδ rather than ψ, vδs rather than vs and Vδs rather than Vs,t o
emphasize the dependence of the respective objects on the discount factor. Of course, ψδ denotes
the matrix (1−δ)(IS −δπ)−1, with ψδ(σ|s)its element in the row σ and column s, vδs denotes
the utility function in the evaluation game Gs and Vδs denotes the NTU-game associated with Gs,
for a given discount factor δ.
Below we state a mathematical result that plays a crucial role in the analysis of the asymptotic
behavior of the strong sequential core. The proof can be found in Predtetchinski et al. (2004).
First recall that, for a given column stochastic (S × S)-dimensional matrix π, the stationary
distribution φ is a probability distribution over the set S satisfying the equation πφ= φ.H e r ew e
regard φ as a column S-dimensional vector. As we assume (A5) the matrix π to be irreducible,
there exists a unique stationary distribution φ. Moreover, φ(s)>0 for all s ∈ S.62 A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 50–66
Theorem 4. Suppose that the matrix π is irreducible. Let φ be the unique stationary distribution





Deﬁnition 5. The game G∞ is a cooperative game where the possibilities of a coalition Q are
represented by the set ×σ∈SUσ(Q), and the players’ expected utilities from consuming the state-





Let C∗(G∞) denotethesetofutilitytuplesu ∈× σ∈SUσ(N) suchthatthereisno z ∈× σ∈SUσ(N)
with vi
∞(z) > vi
∞(u) for all i ∈ N, and no Q ∈ N∗ and y ∈× σ∈SUσ(Q) with vi
∞(y)  vi
∞(u)
for all i ∈ Q.
Thus the utility tuple u is an element of the set C∗(G∞) if it is in the core of the game G∞ and
its expected value v∞(u) cannot be attained by any proper coalition.





By an argument analogous to the proof of Proposition 2, V∞ satisﬁes conditions (G1)–(G3), pro-
vided that the stationary cooperative game   satisﬁes Assumption (A). Clearly, u is an element
of C∗(G∞) if and only if v∞(u) is an element of C∗(V∞).
By Theorem 4, the utility function vδs converges to the utility function v∞ as δ approaches




vδs(u) = v∞(u). (4)
This observation plays a central role in the proof of Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. Let  δ be a family of stationary cooperative games satisfying Assumption (A). Let
u∗ be an element of the set C∗(G∞). Then there exists a δ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that the stationary utility
stream {u∗} is an element of the strong sequential core of the game  δ whenever δ∗ <δ<1.
Proof. We must show that u∗ belongs to the core of the evaluation game Gs for all s ∈ S and all
δ’s sufﬁciently close to one.
First we show that vδs(u∗) lies in the boundary of Vδs(N) for all s ∈ S and for all δ ∈ (0,1).
Since v∞(u∗) ∈ ∂V∞(N), there exists a non-zero vector α ∈ Rn
+ such that v∞(u∗) maximizes
the scalar product α · v over all v ∈ V∞(N). Since φ(σ)is positive for all σ ∈ S, u∗
σ maximizes
α · uσ over all uσ ∈ Uσ(N). Therefore, vδs(u∗) is a maximizer of α · v over all v ∈ Vδs(N),f o r
all s ∈ S and δ ∈ (0,1). This implies that vδs(u∗) is a boundary point of Vδs(N).
Now we show that vδs(u∗) is in the complement of Vδs(Q) for all s ∈ S, Q ∈ N∗ and for all δ
close to one. Suppose not. Then there exists a state s ∈ S, a coalition Q ∈ N∗ and a sequence
δq ∈ (0,1) converging to one such that vδqs(u∗) is an element of Vδqs(Q) for all q. Let the subset
C of Rn ×RS be deﬁned as
C =




×{γ1,...,γS},A. Predtetchinski / Games and Economic Behavior 61 (2007) 50–66 63
where the union is taken over all choices of non-negative coefﬁcients γ1,...,γS adding up to 1.




converges to the vector [v∞(u∗),φ]. Since each vector in the sequence is an element of the set C,
the vector [v∞(u∗),φ] belongs to the closure of C.
Let {e1,...,eS} be the standard ordered basis of RS, and let the subset Cσ of Rn × RS be
deﬁned as Cσ = Uσ(Q)×{eσ}. Observe that the set C can be written as a union
C =





It follows from Theorem 3.3 in Rockafellar (1997, p. 18) that the set C is the convex hull of
the union
 
σ∈SCσ. By Theorem 9.8 in Rockafellar (1997, p. 80) and by Assumption (A4), the
closure of C is therefore given by
clC =




















Thus, the inclusion [v∞(u∗),φ]∈clC together with the positivity of the probabilities φ(σ)im-
plies that v∞(u∗) is an element of
 
σ∈Sφ(σ)Uσ(Q) = V∞(Q). However, this contradicts the
choice of u∗ in C∗(G∞). 
By an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 3 one can show that the NTU-game V∞
is strongly additively b-balanced, provided that the instantaneous NTU-games are additively b-
balanced in all states, and at least one of these NTU-games is strongly additively b-balanced. In
this case the set C∗(G∞) is non-empty. We have thus established the following result.
Corollary 2. Let  δ be a family of stationary cooperative games satisfying Assumption (A), and
let b ∈ B. Suppose that each of the NTU-games Us, s ∈ S, is additively b-balanced, and at least
one of these NTU-games is strongly additively b-balanced. Then there exists a δ∗ ∈ (0,1) such
that the strong sequential core of the game  δ is non-empty whenever δ∗ <δ<1.
6. An example
We construct a family of stationary cooperative games where the strong sequential core is
empty for all δ ∈ (0,1). In this example the stationary cooperative games satisfy Assump-
tion (A∗), and the NTU-game Us is additively b-balanced for all s ∈ S. However, no Us has
the property of strong additive b-balancedness.
Example 3. Consider a family  δ of stationary cooperative games with three players called a, b,
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Table 1
Equations deﬁning the sets Us(Q)
Q s = 1 s = 2
{a} exp(ua)  11
{b} exp(ub)  11
{c} uc  11
{a,b} exp(ua)+exp(ub)  66
{a,c} exp(ua)+uc  86
{b,c} exp(ub)+uc  68
{a,b,c} exp(ua)+exp(ub)+uc  10 10
The stationary distribution over S is given by the vector φ = (0.5,0.5). Table 1 reports the equa-
tions deﬁning the sets of instantaneous utility payoffs.
To prove that the assumptions (A3) and (A4) are satisﬁed, we show that for each coalition Q
and each state s the recession cone of Us(Q) i sg i v e nb yt h es e tR
Q
− ={ y ∈ Rn | yi  0 ∀i ∈ Q}.
The inclusion R
Q
− ⊆ O+[Us(Q)] follows automatically from condition (G2). For the coalition
Q ={ a,b} the converse inclusion follows from the fact that ua  ln6 and ub  ln6 for all
u ∈ Us({a,b}).
Consider now Q ={ a,c}. Let the vector y be an element of O+[Us({a,c})]. By deﬁnition
of the recession cone, y + u ∈ Us({a,c}) whenever u ∈ Us({a,c}). This implies that the vector
y must satisfy the inequality exp(ua)(exp(ya) − 1) + yc  0 for all real numbers ua. Taking
the limit of the left-hand side of the inequality as ua approaches −∞ yields yc  0. Rewriting
the inequality as exp(ya) − 1  −yc exp(−ua) and taking the limit of the right-hand side as
ua approaches +∞ yields ya  0. Thus, y ∈ R
{a,c}
− , as desired. The cases Q ={ b,c} and Q =
{a,b,c} are dealt with similarly.
Let bi
Q = 1 for all Q ∈ N∗ and all i ∈ Q. Using the convexity property of the exponential
function it is not difﬁcult to show that the games Us are additively b-balanced. To see that the
game U1 violates the condition of strong additive b-balancedness for any b ∈ B, observe that
the core of U1 consists of the vector (ln4,ln2,4) alone, and that this vector is feasible for every
coalition of size 2. Thus the set C∗(U1) is empty. A similar argument shows that the game U2
violates the condition of strong additive b-balancedness.



















Table 2 makes it clear that the core of the game V∞ consists of a single point (va,vb,vc) =
(ln3,ln3,4) being feasible for each coalition of size 2. Now a state-contingent utility tuple
(u1,u2) in U1(N) × U2(N) belongs to the core of the game G∞ if and only if 1
2u1 + 1
2u2 = v.
Because U1(N) = U2(N) = V∞(N) and because this set is strictly convex we must have
u1 = u2 = v, for otherwise the point v would be in the interior of the set V∞(N). We see that the
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Table 2
Equations deﬁning the sets Vδs(Q) and V∞(Q)
Q Vδs(Q) V∞(Q)
{a} exp(va)  11
{b} exp(vb)  11
{c} vc  11
{a,b} exp(va)+exp(vb)  66
{a,c} exp(va)+vc  wδs({a,c}) 7
{b,c} exp(vb)+vc  wδs({b,c}) 7
{a,b,c} exp(va)+exp(vb)+vc  10 10
The structure of the NTU-game Vδs for any δ ∈ (0,1) is similar to that of the game V∞, because
wδs({a,c})+wδs({b,c}) = 14. It follows that the core of the NTU-game Vδs consists of a single












As the feasible set of the grand coalition is state-independent and strictly convex, any element
in the core of the evaluation game is state-independent. It follows that the core of the evaluation
































Nowonecancheckthatwδ1({a,c})  = wδ2({a,c}) implyingthattheintersection C(Gδ1)∩C(Gδ2)
is an empty set for all δ ∈ (0,1). Corollary 1 implies that the strong sequential core of the
game  δ is empty for all δ ∈ (0,1).
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